Draft.

Forthcoming in ‘The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Time’, ed. Nina Emery.

Abstract. Time plays an ambiguous role in classical physics. On the one hand, classical physics allows for a picture of time largely fitting with common-sense views about time, as one-dimensional, and flowing from past to future. On the other, various fea- tures of classical physics and formulations of classical mechanics give a less familiar picture of time, as symmetrical between past and future, with apparent teleological qualities. This chapter surveys these varied temporal features of classical physics and draws some conclusions about how to interpret ‘classical time’.

[article] | [draft]

Journal of Physics: Conference Series, 2877 012078

Abstract. The shift from classical to relativistic physics significantly altered our conception of time. From a picture of space and time as autonomous concepts, and of reality as divided into moments of time, relativity theory introduced a picture of four-dimensional spacetime, and a ‘static’ or ‘block universe’ conception of time. This article considers how exactly relativity theory clashes with our ordinary folk conception of time, and what this ultimately means for how we should think about the nature of time.

[article] | [preprint]

Invited essay for Institute of Arts & Ideas.

[published version] | [preprint]

Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 14.

Invited commentary on ‘Physical Time Within Human Time’.

[preprint] | [link to book]

In Understanding Human Time, Oxford University Press, ed. K. M. Jaszczolt.

Abstract. Modern physics has provided a range of motivations for holding time to be fundamentally undirected. But how does a temporally adirectional metaphysics, or ‘C-theory’ of time, fit with the time of experience? In this chapter, I look at what kind of problem human time poses for C-theories. First, I ask whether there is a ‘hard problem’ of human time: whether it is in principle impossible to have the kinds of experience we do in a temporally adirectional world. Second I consider the ‘easy problem’: how specific directed aspects of our temporal experience are to be explained by C-theorists. This leads to a greater issue: is there such a thing as an experience of time direction at all to even be explained? I show how the kinds of experience we have that we typically associate with the idea of time being directed can be accommodated within a directionless picture of time.

[published version] | [preprint]

In Rethinking the Concept of Laws of Nature, Springer, ed. Y. Ben-Menahem.

Abstract. It is often said that the world is explained by laws of nature together with initial conditions. But does that mean initial conditions don’t require further explanation? And does the explanatory role played by initial conditions entail or require that time has a preferred direction? This chapter looks at the use of the ‘initialness defence’ in physics, the idea that initial conditions are intrinsically special in that they don’t require further explanation, unlike the state of the world at other times. Such defences commonly assume a primitive directionality of time to distinguish between initial and final conditions. Using the case study of the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics and the so-called ‘past hypothesis’ — the hypothesis that the early universe was in a state of very low entropy —, I outline and support a deflationary account of the initialness defence that does not presuppose a basic directionality of time, and argue that there is a relevant explanatory asymmetry between initial conditions and the state of systems at other times only if certain causal conditions are satisfied. Hence, the initialness defence is available to those who reject a fundamental direction of time.

[published version] | [preprint]

Synthese, 200, 23 (2022).

Abstract. In what sense is the direction of time a matter of convention? In 'The Direction of Time', Hans Reichenbach makes brief reference to parallels between his views about the status of time’s direction and his conventionalism about geometry. In this article, I: (1) provide a conventionalist account of time direction motivated by a number of Reichenbach’s claims in the book; (2) show how forwards and backwards time can give equivalent descriptions of the world despite the former being the ‘natural’ direction of time; and (3) argue that this offers an important middle-ground position between existing realist and antirealist accounts of the direction of time.

[published version] | [preprint]

Mind, 2021.

Intro. Whatever you think of Bertrand Russell’s famous claim that the ‘law of causality’ is (at least as of 1912) redundant in the ‘advanced sciences’, it is nonetheless the case that a variety of concepts tangled up with the idea of causation — such as determinism and locality — remain ubiquitous within physics and elsewhere across the sciences. Yemima Ben-Menahem’s excellent book, Causation in Science, focuses not on reductive metaphysical accounts of these notions but instead on the roles they play within physics, and the relationships that hold between them, through a series of detailed historical case studies…

[published version] | [preprint]

Philosophy Compass, 2020.

Abstract. “The universe is expanding, not contracting.” Many statements of this form appear unambiguously true; after all, the discovery of the universe’s expansion is one of the great triumphs of empirical science. However, the statement is time-directed: the universe expands towards what we call the future; it contracts towards the past. If we deny that time has a direction, should we also deny that the universe is really expanding? This article draws together and discusses what I call ‘C-theories’ of time — in short, philosophical positions that hold time lacks a direction — from different areas of the literature. I set out the various motivations, aims, and problems for C-theories, and outline different versions of antirealism about the direction of time.

[published version] | [preprint]

British Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 71. issue 1, March 2020, pp. 177–20, doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx025

Abstract. What would it be for a process to happen backwards in time? Would such a process involve different causal relations? It is common to understand the time-reversal invariance of a physical theory in causal terms, such that whatever can happen forwards in time (according to the theory) can also happen backwards in time. This has led many to hold that time-reversal symmetry is incompatible with the asymmetry of cause and effect. This article critiques the causal reading of time reversal. First, I argue that the causal reading requires time-reversal-related models to be understood as representing distinct possible worlds and, on such a reading, causal relations are compatible with time-reversal symmetry. Second, I argue that the former approach does, however, raise serious sceptical problems regarding the causal relations of paradigm causal processes and as a consequence there are overwhelming reasons to prefer a non-causal reading of time reversal, whereby time reversal leaves causal relations invariant. On the non-causal reading, time-reversal symmetry poses no significant conceptual nor epistemological problems for causation.

[published version] | [preprint]

European Journal of Philosophy of Science, 2020, 10: 8; doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0264-6.

Abstract. Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.

[published version] | [preprint]

Co-authored with Milena Ivanova (Cambridge).

Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, 2020; , eds. R. Bliss & J.T.M. Miller. Routledge.

Abstract. While science is taken to differ from non-scientific activities in virtue of its methodology, metaphysics is usually defined in terms of its subject matter. However, many traditional questions of metaphysics are addressed in a variety of ways by science, making it difficult to demarcate metaphysics from science solely in terms of their subject matter. Are the methodologies of science and metaphysics sufficiently distinct to act as criteria of demarcation between the two? In this chapter we focus on several important overlaps in the methodologies used within science and metaphysics in order to argue that focusing solely on methodology is insufficient to offer a sharp demarcation between metaphysics and science, and consider the consequences of this for the wider relationship between science and metaphysics.